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Abstract
If diaspora communities are socialized with democratic values in Western societies, they
could be expected to be sympathetic to the democratization of their home countries. However,
there is a high degree of variation in their behavior. Contrary to the predominant under-
standing in the literature that diasporas act in exclusively nationalist ways, this article argues
that they do engage with the democratization of their home countries. Various challenges to
the sovereignty of their homelands explain whether diasporas involve with procedural or
liberal aspects of democratization. Drawing evidence from the activities of the Ukrainian,
Serbian, Albanian and Armenian diasporas after the end of communism, I argue that unless
diasporas are linked to home countries that enjoy both international legal and domestic
sovereignty, they will involve only with procedural aspects of democratization. Diasporas ﬁlter
international pressure to democratize post-communist societies by utilizing democratic
procedures to advance unresolved nationalist goals.
 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.
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Scholarly interest in the impact of international actors on the democratization of
autocratic or illiberal societies has resulted in valuable ﬁndings about the role of states,0967-067X  2009Published byElsevier Ltd on behalf of TheRegents of theUniversity ofCalifornia.
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nisms of leverage and linkage that facilitate democratization. However, little has been
said about diaspora communities despite their growing international importance in
a globalizing world; their spread in Western democratic countries renders them
potential agents of democratization. This article aims to address this gap.
The puzzle involves causality: if diaspora communities are socialized with
democratic values in Western societies, they could be expected to be sympathetic to
the democratization of their home countries. However there is a high degree of
variation in their behavior. Some diasporas are highly nationalist, others are
sympathetic to illiberal regimes, some are vocal supporters of liberal democracy,
while others express their tacit support for electoral pluralism but not for liberalism.
Moreover, some diasporas act simultaneously in all four ways. How can we explain
such behavioral diversity? This article focuses on explaining the variation of diaspora
involvement with procedural vs. liberal aspects of democratization, which has
received little attention by scholarship so far.
In this article I limit my inquiry to the post-communist world for two reasons.
First, unlike diasporas originating from the Middle East, Africa and Asia,
communities originating in communist countries had limited contact with their
homeland during the Cold War. Some individuals still managed to travel. Never-
theless, threatened by the possibilities of e´migre´ inﬂuence, the communist govern-
ments spent signiﬁcant resources on inﬁltrating diaspora circles, jamming radio
broadcasts, producing propaganda and counterpropaganda and enforcing strict
border controls (Motyl, 1990:140). Few viable networks existed to transmit values,
ideas and practices between diasporas and their homelands. With the end of
communism in 1989 and the rise of the Internet in the mid-1990s political oppor-
tunities emerged for diasporas to develop sustained relationships with the homeland.
Second, after 1989 there was a large-scale migration from this region into Western
societies for political, economic or educational reasons. Most of the migrants were
sympathetic to democratic values and market economies. Even forced migrants from
the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union were exposed to
democratic values upon their arrival. Democratic values became crucial for their
integration into the new societies, especially for those who wanted and managed to
stay. One would expect that ideas and practices supportive of democracy would
easily ﬂow back to the homeland.
Nationalist behavior was common among diaspora groups linked to the post-
communist world.1 Yet contrary to major expectations that diasporas would act in
outwardly nationalist ways (Anderson, 1998; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2000; Byman et al.,
2001;Fair, 2005). I argue that somediaspora communities did engage indemocratization
eﬀorts after 1989, but that challenges to the sovereignty of their homelands accounted for
the variations of their involvement. If diasporas were linked to homelands that1 I narrowly deﬁne the term ‘‘nationalist’’ to denote activities pursued to achieve linguistic, cultural,
political, and territorial goals through hate speech, negation of the rights of others, and other extreme
ideas and methods.
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they engaged with liberal aspects of democracy. In contrast, if diasporas were linked to
states or territorial entities that faced challenges to either their international legal or
domestic sovereignty, the diasporas supported only the procedural aspects of
democracy.
This variation can be explained by the diﬀerent ways in which diasporas ﬁltered
international pressure for democratization. In caseswhere neither international legal nor
domestic sovereignty were challenged, diasporas viewed their engagement with liberal
aspects of democracy as likely to enhance their homeland’s international standing and to
increase its prospects for receiving crucial aid for state-building. In cases where either
international legal or domestic sovereignty were challenged, diasporas viewed their
support for procedural elements of democracy as a coping mechanism to advance
unresolved nationalist goals by means accepted by the international community.
This article begins with a brief discussion of the literature on diasporas vis-a´-vis
homeland politics and relevant arguments from the literature on international actors
and democratization. I then present the selection of cases and study design, followed by
an overview of the cases and the elimination of possible explanatory factors. The central
discussion revolves around challenges to international legal and domestic sovereignty
and how they relate to a diaspora’s support for democratization of the homeland.
Major theoretical accounts
Two major trends of literature are relevant to this study. First, is the emerging
scholarship on diasporas and homeland relations, which has little to say about
diasporas and democratization. Much of it explores the impact of diaspora remit-
tances on economic development in the developing world where remittances account
for approximately 12e15 percent of GDP per capita (World Bank, 2006, 2007;
Lindley, 2005; Kapur, 2003; Oestergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Eckstein, 2003; Levitt,
2001). In addition, the events of September 11, 2001 increased the scholarly focus on
security and on the relationship between diasporas and homeland conﬂicts. This
literature is predominantly case-based and lacks theoretical sophistication but
reveals important insights concerning a pervasive relationship between diasporas and
statehood, which I adapt for the purposes of this study.
Stateless diasporasdin contrast to state-linked onesdare more likely to remain
involved with homeland politics for longer periods of time, particularly as long as
a nationalist struggle continues (Sheﬀer, 2003:152e153).2 A diaspora may remain
engaged in politics even after the formation of a nation-state, because it may
interpret the national interest diﬀerently than the local political elites and lobby the
host states to pursue its alternate priorities. The Jewish and Armenian diasporas are2 Sheﬀer explains why stateless diasporas are particularly prone to remain involved with homeland
politics. He argues that as long as struggle for independence continues the diaspora members ‘‘will be
particularly torn between memories of their homeland and wishes to recapture the past, and the need to
comply with the norms of their host country.’’. ‘‘Tendencies to assimilate and integrate into the host
society are counterbalanced by their strong sentiments for the homeland’’ (Sheﬀer, 2003: 153).
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ated’’ diasporasdformed on the basis of forced rather than voluntary migra-
tiondare particularly prone to participate in sustaining domestic conﬂict (Lyons,
2006; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2000), due to a pervasive myth of return and attachment
to territory. Some authors of particular case studies (for example, Irish, Tamil,
Ethiopian, Albanian, and Croatian diasporas) have captured practices of engage-
ment in internal conﬂicts. Communities provide humanitarian aid and arms, recruit
ﬁghters, lobby homeland governments and international organizations, disseminate
propaganda, stage demonstrations, and tap into the resources of criminal networks
(Adamson, 2005; Fair, 2005; Byman et al., 2001; Shain, 1991). They can also be
crucial to providing the ﬂow of resources upon which warring parties depend and
sustain the markets for commodities extracted from war-torn regions (Gibney and
Hansen, 2005: 139).
Much less has been said about diasporic practices in the context of democrati-
zation. Shain is among the few scholars arguing that diasporas are not just careless
nationalists, but can aid their homeland’s pursuit of democracy. Having explored
Greek, Haitian, Cuban and Mexican cases in the US, among others, Shain argues
that the struggle of diasporas to unseat authoritarian regimes is often led by
political exiles who, prior to departure were engaged in political activities. Foreign
students often engage in demonstrations against non-democratic practices
(1999:51e91, 1994e1995:823e830). Diasporas can transfer funds to civil society
organizations and become critical factors in running democratic political campaigns
inside their homelands (1999/2000). They can challenge the home regime’s attempts
to suppress or co-opt the opposition, contest the regime’s international legitimacy,
expose human rights violations, combat the home regime’s foreign propaganda,
obstruct friendly relations with the US through eﬀective lobbies, and assist and
actively participate in the struggle of domestic opposition (1994e1995: 823e830,
1999:79). In addition, diasporas reframe conﬂict issues to redeﬁne what is politically
acceptable before and during election campaigns (Lyons, 2007). They participate in
elections from abroad or try to change restrictive electoral laws prohibiting their
participation (Brand, 2006). They forge links with civic organizations in the host-
land and seek to promote democratic and liberal values in the homeland (Biswas,
2007; Shain, 2007).
Since scholarly attempts to capture the dynamics of diasporas and democratiza-
tion are still sporadic and case-based, I have consulted accounts from a secondary
body of literature on international actors and democratization, focusing on their
impact on changes from ‘‘competitive authoritarianisms’’ or ‘‘hybrid regimes.’’ Such
regimes explicate both democratic and authoritarian elements (Levitsky and Way,
2002; Diamond, 2002; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Karl, 1995). This body of work is
informative because my study focuses on homelands in the post-communist world
which host such regimes, and for which diaspora engagement with democratization
has the potential to make a political diﬀerence.
The impact of policies of conditionality, used by international institutions and
particularly by the European Union, have been deemed crucial for the liberalization
and democratic change of the 12 new East European members (Vachudova, 2005,
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been the single factor for change, as several states that underwent electoral
revolutions in the early 2000sdSerbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and
Kyrgystan (2005)dwere not subjected to such leverage and had no prospects for
EU membership. Conditionality has co-existed with the mechanisms of control,
consent and contagion (Schmitter, 2001: 28e29). The role of mass mobilization and
large-scale non-violent protests with a focal point on fraudulent elections are the
main characteristics in these cases (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006; Kuzio, 2005; York,
2002). The long-term impact of international democracy promotion programs,
especially generous in the post-communist arena compared to other regions,
the diﬀusion of knowledge and strategies from ‘‘graduates’’ of previous elec-
toral revolutions to protesters in new places are considered to explain electoral
revolutions (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006:7e11). In addition, the economic, political,
social, organizational and communication linkages between citizens of a democra-
tizing polity and the Western democratic world prevent elites in competitive
authoritarian regimes from consolidating their hold on power (Levitsky and
Way, 2006).
The arguments about the democratization of illiberal polities relate to my
discussion of diasporas by increasing understanding about practices that diasporas
could use to promote democratization in the homeland. Do they lobby their host
countries to inﬂuence foreign policy and obtain aid packages for the home
country? Do they participate in the dispersal of aid? Do they aid electoral
revolutions?
The contribution of this article to the literature on diasporas and democratization
is threefold. First, it moves the discussion beyond consideration of diasporic prac-
tices only, and accounts for the variation in diasporic support for liberalism and
procedural aspects of democracy. Second, it provides a comparative explanatory
framework for under-researched empirical material on the Ukrainian, Serbian,
Albanian and Armenian diasporas, linked to the post-communist world. Third, it
theorizes about diasporic activism with respect to non-violent periods in the
homeland.
Without trying to resolve the conceptual debate about the term ‘‘diaspora,’’ in
this article I adopt a deﬁnition that Adamson and Demetriou use to address the
contours of a ‘‘diaspora’’ in the global space, containing both positivist and
constructivist elements:A diaspora can be identiﬁed as a social collectivity that exists across state
borders and that has succeeded over time to: 1) sustain a collective national,
cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sus-
tained ties with a real or imagined homeland and 2) display an ability to
address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through
a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links
(2007:497).I limit the scope of the term to include only ethno-national groups that reside
outside territories adjacent to the homeland. Anderson (1998) calls such diasporas
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homeland since they do not bear the consequences of their actions.Size of the diasporas in the United States, 1980e2000.
Census Year/Diaspora 1980
a
1990
b
2000
c
Albanian 38,658 47,710 113,661
Armenian 212,621 308,096 385,488
Serbian 100,941 117,000 140,337
Ukrainian 730,056 740,000 892,922
a US Census (1980), Groups Who Reported at Least One Ancestry.
b US Census (1992), Detailed Ancestry Groups for States.
c US Census (2004), Ancestry.Study design and methodology
I selected four diaspora cases dUkrainian, Serbian, Albanian and Arme-
niandon a control variabled‘‘competitive authoritarianism’’dand an explanatory
variable e‘‘challenges to sovereignty of the homeland.’’3 All four diasporas have
been linked to polities in the post-communist world that have demonstrated
characteristics of a ‘‘competitive authoritarian regime’’dsemi-authoritarian leaders
and illiberal political practices. While there is a large universe of cases of such
polities in the post-communist world, I narrow the scope to four cases that have
experienced diﬀerent degrees of challenges to sovereignty. Ukraine is a new state
that became independent in 1991. Serbia was a collapsing state during the wars of
disintegration of Serbian-dominated former Yugoslavia after 1989. Kosovo and
Nagorno-Karabakh have been secessionist regions since 1991, with Albania and
Armenia as kin-states related to diﬀerent degrees to their secessionist movements.
Such polities constitute ‘‘hard tests’’ for diasporas to engage with promoting
democratization, because of a highly contentious national issue at stake, and
diasporas could be expected to behave in exclusively nationalist ways. For example,
the four cases of this study diﬀer from the case of the Polish diaspora, which was
traditionally anti-communist but linked to a state that is internally ethnically
homogeneous and enjoys international legal sovereignty. If and when the four
diasporas engage in democratization eﬀorts alongside their nationalist practices, it
must be for other reasons than nationalism.
This study focuses on non-violent periods during the post-communist transitions
after 1989. I limit my inquiry to such periods because during war involving the
homeland the diaspora oﬀers unequivocal support for the homeland unless the war is
between the homeland and the host-land when strong loyalty dilemmas ensue (Shain,
1999: 68). External violence trumps diasporic concerns for democratization that exist
prior to it or in its aftermath. I focus on Serbia in the periods 1989e1992 (before the3 For a discussion on how to avoid selection bias, see King et al. (1994), and Brady and Collier (2004).
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violent warfare in Kosovo in 1998e1999), and after NATO’s military intervention in
Kosovo in 1999 until 2007. For Kosovo the discussion is limited to the period after
NATO’s military intervention (1999e2007), since earlier the Kosovars were engaged
in and violent warfare. For Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh I focus on the non-
violent period after the cease-ﬁre (1994e2007). There has been no violent warfare in
Ukraine since 1991.
I limit my inquiry to diasporas residing in the United States, although I am
aware that diaspora networks are ﬂuid and transnational.4 Nevertheless, diasporas
in the US were some of the most vocal and participatory in homeland aﬀairs during
the 1990s, and were empowered by a domestic structure of interest politics,
allowing the formation of lobby groups that could directly aspire to inﬂuence
foreign policy.
I combine Mill’s methods of agreement and diﬀerence. I use the method of
agreement to identify causes that were present in cases where diasporas supported
procedural aspects of democracy only (Serbian, Albanian, Armenian), and the
method of diﬀerence to identify a cause that was absent in a case where a diaspora
was supportive of liberal ideas as well (Ukrainian).
This study operates with one dependent and one independent variable. The
dependent variable is ‘‘diaspora involvement in homeland democratization.’’ Dias-
poras make claims and engage in activities related to democratization on two
levels. First, they engage only with procedural elements of democracydfree and
fair elections, turnover of power and support for various political actors that
aspire to regime changedso that support for political contestation remains more
important than the content of the issues involved. Second, they support liberal
elements of democracydsuch as freedom of speech, free media, civic rights and
initiatives cutting across the ethnic dividedwhich demands a guiding liberal
creed.
The independent variable is ‘‘challenges to the sovereignty of the homeland.’’ I base
my understanding on Krasner’s (2004) conceptualization of international legal and
domestic sovereignty existing alongside Westphalian sovereignty.5 Since the
dimensions of challenges to international legal and domestic sovereignty are relevant
to all of my cases, I use them as the two nominal categories of this variable. Inter-
national legal sovereignty designates the judicial recognition of an international legal
entity. Domestic sovereignty denotes the abilities of domestic authority structures to
control activities within their territorial borders.4 In contrast to the three other cases, the Ukrainian diaspora has a signiﬁcant presence in Canada
(around 1 million, Pawliczko, 1994:328) and is highly networked with the US. The Ukrainian diaspora in
Russia is the largest (around 4.4 million, Wilson, 1998:107).
5 Westphalian sovereignty refers to states’ ability to enjoy non-interference from other states in deci-
sion-making within their own borders. This dimension is problematic in the cases of Kosovo and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Kosovo has been ruled by United Nations Administration since 1999, and Nagor-
no-Karabakh has experienced strong political and economic inﬂuences from Armenia since 1994.
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classiﬁes it as ‘‘classic,’’ since it existed before the era of nation-states’ formation. It
dates back to Mongol conquests of the Armenian heartland in the 13th century when
refugees ﬂed to neighboring Eastern European regions and the Middle East (To¨l-
o¨lyan, 2000:116). The deﬁning event for the Armenian diasporic identity is the 1915
genocide, carried out by the collapsing Ottoman Empire and followed by the
expulsion of approximately 1.5 million Armenians to the Middle East and the
Balkans (Panossian, 1998:84). The other three diasporas stem from the period of
nation-state formation, and could be classiﬁed as ‘‘modern’’ (Sheﬀer, 2003: 75e77).
The slowly disintegrating Habsburg and Ottoman empires gave rise to the formation
of an independent Serbian state in 1878 and Albania in 1912, which were accom-
panied by a ﬁrst wave of primarily economic migration to Europe and the US. In the
1880s, Albanian migration was existent but minimal, unlike the Serbian. Most
notably, Serbian migrants did not stem from Serbia proper, but from Montenegro
and lands along the Dalmatian coast, controlled at that time by AustriaeHungary,
including present-day Bosnian and Croatian territories (Hockenos, 2003:114; Vuic,
2002:4). The Ukrainians started migrating to the US in the late 1870s in a wave that
extended to other peoples of Eastern Europe including Czechs, Poles, Jews, and
Hungarians (Ciment, 2001:1238). Ukrainians originated predominantly from Galicia
and western parts of present-day Ukraine (Kuropas, 1991). Those who migrated
from the Carpathian lands often called themselves Rusyns (Magocsi, 2008). The
Ukrainian and Armenian diasporas are similar in that they came primarily from one
region (respectively from Western Ukraine and present-day Turkey), which colored
their relationship to the homeland.WavesThe ﬁrst migration wave to the US consisted of peasants who found jobs
in factories in the Northeast and Midwest. These populations, living far
from industrial centers in their homelands, chose to migrate to the US in search of
higher wages (Ciment, 2001: 1239). This explains why migration from the Ottoman
landsdincluding Albanians and Armeniansdwas not as signiﬁcant as that of
Ukrainians and Serbs living in rapidly industrializing regions. While the ‘‘Ellis
Island’’ economic migration incorporated all ethnic communities, subsequent waves
were determined primarily by political developments. A large wave of Armenian
migration followed the 1915 genocide. Another followed the outbreak of the civil
war in Lebanon (1975e1990) and the Iranian revolution (1978). Prior to the end of
communism, the Armenian community in the US was largely composed of ﬁrst or
second generations remembering the genocide who did not trace their origin to
Eastern Armenia (present-day Armenia), but to the former Ottoman lands
(Bakalian, 1993:23e25). A large migration of Ukrainians, Serbs and Albanians
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around 85,000 Ukrainians (Fink, 1993:37), tens of thousands of Serbs (Pajic, 2007)
and between 30,000 and 50,000 Albanians (Hockenos, 2003:213). Severe travel
restrictions by the Soviet Union decreased the ability of Armenians and Ukrainians
to emigrate. The travel policy in Yugoslavia was more open, and more Albanians
than Serbs took advantage of ‘‘guest worker’’ opportunities abroad. In the aftermath
of the 1981 Kosovo riots, thousands of Kosovo Albanians resettled in the New York
area (Hockenos, 2003:215). A ﬁnal wave of emigration followed the end of
communism. During this wave, the Albanian diaspora was estimated to have almost
doubled in numbers compared to the previous period (see Table 1). For all
communities, this wave incorporated the ‘‘brain-drain’’ generation, economic
migrants, and some refugees from war-torn regions, among them people from
Kosovo and Karabakh.Spread and sizeThe following two tables oﬀer an overview of the estimated size and spread of the
diasporas globally and in the US. The ﬁrst table represents a snapshot of the dias-
poras at present. The numbers in both tables are either estimates by scholars or
activists who err on the side of exaggeration (global size data), or census data (US)
which are more conservative. In both cases the numbers incorporate various
generations of diaspora representation, but do not reﬂect the much smaller numbers
of politically active community members who make claims about their descent.Diaspora institutions after 1989Two major groups in the Ukrainian diaspora had competing stances regarding
homeland political aﬀairs. On one side were the so-called ‘‘derzhavnyky’’ (statists),
represented most vocally by some leaders of the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC),
which supported Ukrainian statehood regardless of its domestic politics (Kuzio and
Deychakiwsky, 2005). On the other side was the umbrella Action Ukraine Coalition
(AUC) that took a pro-democratic stance. A 1970s split between the radical wing of
the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUNr) which took over the umbrella
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and the democratic wing of the dia-
spora’s left which established the Ukrainian Coordinating Council, still remains.6
However, during the 1990s these divisions have become less prominent.
The Serbian diaspora was much more defensive of the nationalist project, with the
exception of Milan Panic, an inﬂuential California-based businessman who diﬀered
with his pro-Yugoslav rather than pro-Serbian attitude. The dominant voice was
represented by the Serbian Unity Congress (SUC) and organizations and individuals6 OUN originated in 1929 to ﬁght against occupation of Ukrainian-inhabited lands by Poland, Russia,
and Germany. It developed branches in the Western hemisphere, including a strong US presence, where its
various political wings dominated diasporic life during communism. The most extreme OUN wing
(revolutionaries), led by Stepan Bandera, was the largest Ukrainian e´migre´ organization.
Table 1
Size and spread.
Diaspora Size (global) Spread (global) Signiﬁcant
communities
Spread (US)
Albanian More than
1 milliona
US, Germany, Switzerland, England
Italy, Greece, Turkey, England,
Canada, Australia
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Jersey area, Chicago, Detroit
Armenian ca. 4 millionb US, Russia, France, Georgia,
Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Ukraine,
Turkey, Argentina, Canada, Australia
Los Angeles, Boston, New York,
New Jersey, Mid-Atlantic area,
Detroit, Chicago, Michigan,
Ohio, Wisconsin
Serbian ca. 3.5 millionc US, Russia, France, Romania,
Canada, Australia
New York, Mid-Atlantic, Chicago,
Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh,
Wisconsin
Ukrainian 20 milliond US, Russia, Canada, UK, Germany,
France, Argentina, Brazil, Australia,
Kazakhstan
New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago
a Kosta (2004), Sheﬀer (2003).
b To¨lo¨lyan (2000).
c Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (2007).
d Ukrainian World Congress (2004).
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backdrop of a more established and inﬂuential Croatian lobby (Hockenos,
2003:107). Over time SUC managed to overpower old ‘‘Chetnik’’ organizations,
which continued to exist but exerted limited inﬂuence.
Two main groups have been inﬂuential in the Albanian diaspora. The older
onedthe New York-based AlbanianeAmerican Civic League (AACL)devolved
after the 1981 Kosovo Albanian riots, and was represented by Joe DioGuardi,
a former Congressman of Albanian ancestry. Due to inter-personal disagreements
among AACL members, the National AlbanianeAmerican Council (NAAC) was
formed in 1996. It became the main lobby group based in Washington D.C.
Although in competition with each other, these two groups are unanimous
supporters of the self-determination of Kosovo, with more moderate stances taken
by NAAC. The New York-based Pan-Albanian organization ‘‘Vatra’’ has existed
since the early 1900s, and other groups were formed during communism to represent
a generation of post-war exiles (Hockenos, 2003:208; Trix, 2001:4e5). No groups
have been as inﬂuential as AACL or NAAC during the 1990s.
Finally, the dominant group in the Armenian diaspora stems from the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (ARF), widely known as the ‘‘Dashnaks.’’ For more than
half a century they have been the most vocal advocates for Turkey’s recognition of
the Armenian genocide. Contrary to the dynamics in the three other cases where
organizations dominating diaspora politics during communism lost inﬂuence in the
1990s, the Armenian Dashnaks remained quite powerful. Other groupsdsuch as
Liberal and Socialist Parties that exerted some impact during the Cold Wardlost
their inﬂuence to the ARF. Currently, two of the main Armenian lobby organ-
izationsdthe Armenian Assembly of America and the Armenian National
Committee of Americadare Dashnak-based.
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This study asks why some diasporas engaged in procedural or liberal aspects of
democratization of their homelands against the backdrop of existing nationalist
practices. Although highly plausible as a potential explanation, prior experience with
anti-communism does not account for pro-democracy-oriented behavior in the
transition phase. The Ukrainian, Serbian, and Albanian political migrants after
World War II held strong anti-communist views, unlike the Armenians, but
although the Ukrainians engaged with liberal aspects of democratization during the
transition, the others did not. All four diasporas were part of the Captive Nations
movement, and considered their homeland governments enemies of their nations and
stooges of a foreign power (Shain, 1994e1995:834). The Ukrainian diaspora was
particularly involved in this process, with a 1959 draft of the Captive Nations to be
passed by the US Congress, developed by Lev Dobrianski, then-leader of the
Ukrainian lobby (Fink, 1993:13). Moreover, political exiles staﬀed Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, and with US government help often engaged in other
projects spreading anti-communist propaganda. For example, the New York-based
Prolog Corporation, established in 1953 by the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation
Council and OUN, targeted Ukrainian intelligentsia with book translations and the
journal Suchasnist. When samizdat groups developed in the 1960s, ideas were not
simply imported from abroad, but were ‘‘boomeranged.’’7 Works of dissidents were
smuggled out of Ukraine, published in large quantities in the US, and then smuggled
back to the homeland (Kupchinsky, 2008).8 The rest of the diasporas were less
active, but the anti-communist practices of the Serbian diaspora were distinct outside
of the Captive Nations process because the resolution ignored issues of territoriality
that were important to the Serbs (Kesic, 2007). Serbian diaspora members were
highly opposed to the US maintaining a relationship with communist but non-
aligned Yugoslavia and boycotted the 1963 visit of Yugoslavia’s President Tito to
the US (Hockenos, 2003:120e121).
If prior experience with anti-communism is not an explanation, is prior experience
with violence a predictor for diaspora involvement with procedural aspects of
democratization? Unlike the Ukrainians, the Albanian, Armenian, and Serbian
diasporas had to cope with war in their homelands during some parts of the 1990s.
As ‘‘conﬂict-generated diasporas’’ they are supposedly more prone to sustain
conﬂicts in their homeland than other communities. Although this reasoning sounds
plausible, it is not explanatory either. Indeed, all three diasporas had acted in
nationalist ways during periods of warfareddrafting ﬁghters and funding violent7 Keck and Sikkink (1998:13) argue that human rights networks in authoritarian and illiberal societies
engage in a ‘‘boomerang pattern’’ of domestic change. They create coalitions with external actors (states or
international organizations) which in turn pressure their own governments to adopt human rights changes.
8 During communism the US government preferred to work with individual exiles rather than with
diaspora organizations often marred by internal disagreements (Kupchinsky, 2008). For example, when
Soviet Ukrainian cultural groups traveled to the US, members of the diaspora’s democratic wing would
meet with them, while radicals would call them ‘‘Soviet puppets’’ and boycott the activity.
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homeland in the aftermath of violence, since they continued to maintain their
outwardly nationalist practices. Yet they engaged with procedural aspects of
democratization parallel to their nationalist activities.
Another possible explanation could be derived from a classic theoretical under-
standing that middle class and higher levels of education are conducive to demo-
cratic behavior. I argue that this is not an explanation either. With the exception of
a relatively new Albanian diaspora, which has been seeking its way into the middle
class, all other diasporas are already of middle class status, measured on incomes and
acquired education (see Table 2).
A ﬁnal possible explanation relates to Shain’s (1999:78) understanding that the
propensity of diasporas to participate in campaigns to overthrow non-democratic
regimes is aﬀected by the oﬃcial US posture towards the home government. I argue
that this is not the case with respect to regime change in the post-Cold War period,
since the US has been highly supportive of the democratization of all countries in the
post-communist world, unlike during the Cold War, on which Shain based his
analysis. At that time the US was anti-communist with respect to Eastern Europe,
but supporting ‘‘friendly dictators’’ in some countries in Latin America. Even if we
understand Shain’s meaning of the word ‘‘posture’’ not in terms of regime, but in
terms of favorable US foreign policy treatment of the homeland, it is not clear how
this could account for the variation of diaspora behavior towards democratization.
Among the four cases, only Albania and Kosovo enjoyed a clearly favorable
treatment by Washington, which opposed the collective infringement on the Koso-
var human rights by the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. Ukraine and Armenia/
Nagorno-Karabakh enjoyed limited support. Support for Ukraine was secondary to
a strong USeRussia relationship, which, however problematic, continues to be of
vital US interest. Armenia’s importance was secondary to strong US interest in
Azerbaijani oil and its geopolitical signiﬁcance, although the Armenian political
lobby remained powerful in the US Congress.9 The most disadvantaged of all was
Serbia, since through much of the 1990s Milosevic was considered the troublemaker
of the Balkans. The US attitude changed in 1998 when Milosevic increased pressure
on the Kosovars; this culminated in NATO’s 1999 military intervention and follow-
up policies to unseat his illiberal regime.
Moreover, two pieces of interview-based evidence suggest that diasporas could be
interested in engaging in democratization even in periods when US foreign policy is
more tolerant towards illiberal rulers in the homeland. The ﬁrst one relates to the
period 1995e1998, when the US considered Milosevic ‘‘the peace-maker of Day-
ton,’’ and gave its controversial support for him. At that time several diaspora
individuals, well-placed in the Washington D.C. circles, were hired to work on9 The Armenian lobby was instrumental in inﬂuencing the US Congress to pass two acts in 1992dthe
Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act and Section 907 from the Freedom Support Actdaimed at preventing the
US from giving ﬁnancial assistance to Azerbaijan due to its blockade on Armenia and Karabakh (ACNIS,
1997). This is considered a strong achievement of the lobby against the backdrop of US interests in
Azerbaijani oil.
Table 2
Diasporas: class and education status.a
Diaspora Per capita
income
Individuals below poverty level
and percentage of total
Bachelor’s degree and
higher and percentage of total
Albanian 17,287 22,208 (19 %) 17,077 (15 %)
Armenian 25,847 45,477 (11 %) 93,184 (24 %)
Serbian 27,340 9,845 (7%) 33,658 (24%)
Ukrainian 28,422 79,993 (9%) 252,771 (28%)
a Data from US Census (2004) at http://factﬁnder.census.gov.
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opposition movement in Serbia. An informant argued that until 1998, when Milo-
sevic started to be considered the ‘‘problem for Kosovo,’’ key ﬁgures in the US
administration were uninterested in hearing from him about the uniﬁcation of the
Serbian opposition or in meeting with opposition leaders. The second piece of
evidence relates to Ukraine. The practicality of US foreign policy towards Ukraine
and its respect for electoral democracy have not been conducive to liberal voices for
change. Close to the 2004 elections which turned into the liberal Orange Revolution,
the US administration focused on the electoral procedure and was prepared to work
with whatever leader won those elections in a free and fair manner, despite mounting
voices in diaspora circles that the pre-election campaign had been manipulated.Challenges to the sovereignty of the homeland
Prior diasporic experience with anti-communism, violence, middle class status,
and US foreign policy stance towards the homeland cannot explain the variation of
diaspora involvement with the homeland democratization. In contrast, I argue that
the explanatory power lies in challenges to the sovereignty of their homelands.
Unless diasporas are linked to states that enjoy both international legal and domestic
sovereignty, they will engage only with the procedural aspects of democracy. Table 3
demonstrates visually this argument.
Only the Ukrainian diaspora became involved with liberal elements of democ-
ratization. In this case neither the international nor the domestic sovereignty of the
homeland was seriously challenged. Having become independent in 1991, Ukraine
needed to assert itself against Russia externally, and to internally govern anTable 3
Challenges to sovereignty and diaspora involvement with democratization.
Homelands Challenges to Domestic
Sovereignty
Challenges to International
Legal Sovereignty
Diaspora Involvement
with Democratization
Ukraine No No Liberal
Serbia Yes No Procedural
Kosovo No Yes Procedural
Karabakh No Yes Procedural
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theless, it maintained control over its entire territory and over its domestic
institutions.
Ukraine’s independence was a subject of strong diaspora activism. It started with
lobbying US President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I, continued
moderately with the Captive Nations process, and resurfaced vigorously with pres-
sure on George Bush Sr. to recognize Ukraine, despite his speech delivered in Kiev
almost at the eve of independence, vehemently opposing aspirations for statehood
(McConnell, 1990; Fink, 1993; Magocsi, 2005:173e175). The diaspora stood over-
whelmingly behind the local Rukh movement which advocated both state inde-
pendence and democratization (Hadzewycz, 2008). Issues of sovereignty and
democratization were highly intertwined for the Ukrainian diaspora until 1991. Once
the state became independent, the two issues gradually separated with the growing
understanding that democratization was a necessary ingredient for obtaining
external support for state-building (McConnell, 2007). State-building was of para-
mount importance, since the long-cherished independence needed to be preserved
under any circumstances.
Pro-democratic elements in the diaspora realized that Ukraine needed support
from the US and the international community in order to assert itself as an inde-
pendent state against Russia in particular, Ukraine’s democratization was closely
linked to a debate on how to join NATO in order to withstand Russia, and to make
a ‘‘civilizational choice.’’ Since the US was Ukraine’s main Western lobbyist on
NATO, the diaspora ﬁltered pressures for democratization by considering that its
own pro-democratic behavior could raise the country’s international standing. For
this reason, pro-democratic elements in diaspora circles did not rule out a positive
consideration of the Russian-speaking minority, to the extent that it served state-
building purposes.
In the early 1990s the Ukrainian diaspora was instrumental in providing
continued humanitarian support for the victims of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear
disaster, reintroducing earlier banned nationalist historiographies, and marking the
60th anniversary of the 1932e33 famine.10 However, when it approached democ-
ratization, it acted in line with the ‘‘building of a new state’’ dynamic. It is not
surprising that there was a large group of derzhavnyki (statists)dmost vocally rep-
resented by leading personalities in the Ukrainian World Congressdwho apologized
for the undemocratic practices of the Leonid Kuchma regime and criticized Amer-
ican policies and legislative initiatives related to the homeland. This group was aware
of Kuchma’s semi-authoritarianism, but was afraid that criticism would backﬁre
against Ukraine (Deychakiwsky, 2007). The ‘‘building of a new state’’ dynamics
created dilemmas even in pro-liberal diaspora circles, who wanted to pursue10 Eight hundred thousand copies of Orest Subtelny’s nationalist historiography Ukraine. A History
(University of Toronto Press, 1989) were published in Ukrainian and Russian. The Ukrainian famine,
a result of Joseph Stalin’s forced collectivization, was marked as an important traumatic event in the
diaspora. Thus, one could claim that, like the Armenian diaspora, the Ukrainian diaspora stresses
remembering a collective trauma, although it is not considered ‘‘genocide.’’
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pro-liberal organizations initially concentrated on organizing policy forums and
mobilizing UkrainianeAmericans on the grassroots level to support Ukraine-related
resolutions in Congress (Kuzio and Deychakiwsky, 2005). Vocal individuals working
in key positions dsuch as the US Helsinki Commission on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, the NGO ‘‘Freedom House,’’ and the two UkrainianeAmerican
newspapers, Ukrainian Weekly and Svobodadwere among the ﬁrst to raise criticism
of the unsatisfactory advancement of democracy in Ukraine.11 In 1990e1991 when
US media knew little of developments in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Weekly informed
every US congressional oﬃce, because it was the ﬁrst foreign organization to receive
accreditation in Ukraine (Hadzewycz, 2008). Soon thereafter the US-Ukraine
foundation established local presence as well, and an institutional partnership with
the ‘‘Pylyp Orlyk Institute’’ advancing a pro-liberal agenda (McConnell, 2007).12
Initiatives cutting across the ethno-linguistic divide followed to address liberal
aspects of democratization unlike in the other cases. The Ukrainian Congress
Committee of America developed the ‘‘Get-Out-The-Vote-Project.’’ Initially in
town-hall meetings and later in media forums debates were organized between
representatives of parties from all parts of the political spectrum (Hadzewycz, 2008).
The USeUkraine foundation focused on the liberal education of parliamentarians,
and paired cities from all parts of Ukraine and the US to transfer know-how between
mayors at the grassroots level (Andrushkiw, 2007). American-born Toronto
University professor Paul Magocsi added a minority rights aspect to the diaspora’s
engagement with democratization. Through his involvement with the worldwide
Rusyn movement, he exerted pressure on Ukraine to recognize Rusyns as a separate
ethno-cultural group (Magocsi, 2008).13
In the competition between adversarial diasporic stances, the liberal agenda
started gaining more ground during Kuchma’s most severe semi-authoritarian11 Orest Deychiawsky has been a staﬀ advisor at the Helsinki Commission for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, one of the main US-governmental organizations interested in promoting democratic change
and respect for human rights during communism, and has retained an important function in the ﬁeld as
well. Adrian Karatnycky is the founder of the Orange Circle, an international network of friends of
Ukraine, and has served as Executive Director and President of Freedom House, a prominent NGO
interested in measuring and promoting democracy. Roma Hadzewycz is a long-term editor-in-chief of
Ukrainian Weekly, published by the Ukrainian National Association, and a staunch supporter of
Ukraine’s democratization.
12 Nadia McConnell explicitly noted during her interview that because the US-Ukraine Foundation is not
a diaspora membership organization, she does not consider it a clear representative of the diaspora.
Nevertheless she agreed with the author that if a deﬁnition of the term ‘‘diaspora’’ incorporates those who
make political claims about the homeland, then her organization could still be considered diasporic.
13 After World War I and the growth of the Ukrainian nationalist movement both domestically and in
the diaspora, the Rusyns who currently reside in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and
Ukraine started experiencing strong pressures to assimilate (Kuropas, 1991) Unlike the other East
European countries, Ukraine did not oﬃcially recognize the Rusyns as a separate ethnicity throughout the
1990s, but an act of a local council recently did. While the Rusyn movement has supported local aspi-
rations for cultural recognition, it stands against recently voiced demands for territorial autonomy and
independence (Magocsi, 2008).
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of the journalist Georgy Gongadze, the release of the Melnychenko tapes, and the
disclosure of mounting corruption became a tipping point for resentment against the
violations of freedom of speech and human rights (Karmazyn, 2007). The two
UkrainianeAmerican newspapers were outspoken in this process, and over time
witnessed a change of heart in the diaspora. While in 2000e2001 the editor of
Svoboda received a signiﬁcant number of letters from diaspora members discon-
tented with its criticisms of Kuchma, in 2003e2004 such letters almost completely
ceased (Deychakiwsky, 2007). Moreover, the diaspora raised an overwhelmingly
positive response towards the Orange Revolution. Apart from alarming US insti-
tutions about pre-election campaign irregularities, the diaspora utilized a well-
developed network of UkrainianeAmerican credit unions to gather at least $1.0
million (Deychakiwsky, 2007). In Chicago alone USD 363,000 were raised (Wilson,
2005:184).14 A large number of diaspora members acted as election monitors,
especially during the third round of presidential elections, and held demonstrations
in numerous cities (Kuzio and Deychakiwsky, 2005). The local developments in
Ukraine after 2004 brought disillusionment among UkrainianeAmericans. The
diaspora is nowadays critical even of President Yushchenko because he did not
deliver on promises to investigate the Gongadze murder and his own poisoning
(Kupchinsky, 2008).
Unlike the Ukrainian diaspora, linked to a state that enjoyed both international
legal and domestic sovereignty throughout the 1990s, the Serbian diaspora was
linked to the collapsing state of Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia de facto
enjoyed legal sovereignty externally, as did Serbia-Montenegro after the Dayton-
Accords in 1995, yet Serbia proper has not had eﬀective domestic sovereigntyd
especially over Kosovodsince 1989. The Kosovar parallel structures were a major
challenge to its domestic sovereignty until the warfare ended in 1999. The United
Nation’s Administration rule in Kosovo posed the same challenge in its aftermath.
Thus, even during non-violent periods, Serbia was not able to control the governance
structures within its domestic territory.
Nationalist practices predominated among the Serbian diaspora, as Hockenos
(2003) describes very well. This paper does not examine nationalist practices alone
but diaspora engagement with various aspects of democratization. I argue that
engagement with procedural aspects of democracy took place in order to advance an
unfulﬁlled nationalist project by mechanisms acceptable to the larger international
community. When engaging with democratization, diaspora groups focused their
eﬀortsd however sporadic and uncoordinateddto support Milosevic’s opposition
rather than civil society groups with more liberal agendas. Opposition support did
not mean support for liberalism, since the opposition was often no less nationalist14 Chicago is home to a large UkrainianeAmerican community, and to Katherine Chumachenko, wife of
current President Viktor Yushchenko (Wilson, 2005:184) Chumachenko could be considered a diaspora
returnee engaged in transition reforms, since she resettled in Ukraine in the early 1990s after having
worked in the Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush administrations. In Ukraine she was a director of the
Pylyp Orlyk Institute.
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organizations rendered limited support to both opposition leader Vuk Draskovic
and his ultra-nationalist rival, Vojislav Seselj (Hockenos, 2003:127). The inﬂuential
Serbian Unity Congress (SUC) initially supported Milosevic, but changed its atti-
tude after Dayton in 1995, considering him an opportunist who jeopardized the
interests of Serbs and the greater Serbia goal (Hockenos, 2003:109). SUC supported
opposition groups that could oust him and sponsored leaders to travel and testify
before the US Congress. SUC’s President Michael Djiordjevic often acted as the
oﬃcial representative for Vuk Draskovic, Zoran Djindzhic, and Vesna Pesic in the
US. SUC co-organized with other diaspora groups a convention in Budapest in
November 1999 in an attempt to unify the highly fragmented opposition (Hockenos,
2003:171e172).
Further evidence suggests that the Serbian diaspora’s involvement with democ-
ratization had little to do with promoting liberalism. Prior to the 1990 elections in
Serbia, Tosic’s Democratic Party, which included liberal intellectuals, went virtually
unnoticed in Serb diaspora circles (Hockenos, 2003:127). Serbian peace and human
rights activists were branded ‘‘spies’’ and ‘‘traitors.’’ Although promoting that Serbs
were equally involved in the wars of disintegration of former Yugoslavia and should
not be blamed as the main perpetrators of atrocities (Veric, 2007), there is
a surprising absence in SUC’s newsletter of the need to hand over war criminals to
the Hague-based International Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia. The tribunal has
never been considered legitimate (Veric, 2007; Kesic, 2007). Furthermore, prior to
the 2000 elections Serbian diaspora organizations were reluctant to cooperate with
US organizations on fostering regime change (Anon. 1, 2007). Most notably, there
was little support among diaspora members for the student Otpor [Resistance]
movement which was the driving force behind the 2000 electoral change (Pajic, 2007;
Bakovic, 2007).15 Those who aided the process by helping buy leaﬂets and develop
street campaigns were a few recent political migrants and students in Western
academic institutions (Bakovic, 2007).
The lack of domestic sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo continued to create
obstacles to diasporic involvement with liberal aspects of democratization even after
the 2000 electoral change. While SUC increased its activities in the realm of business
networks, student exchanges, and leadership programs bringing Serbian oﬃcials to
the US (Cerovic, 2007), it made the non-resolution of Kosovo’s ﬁnal status
a centerpiece of its agenda. Its message was cleardKosovo is an integral part of
Serbia and should not become independent. Out of 29 issues of the Bulletin of the
Serbian Unity Congress (16 issues from 1998 to 1999 and 13 issues from 2000 to
2007) 23 had at least one article dedicated to Kosovo. Coverage of the activities of
the Serbian Orthodox Church increased after 2000, since the Church became
instrumental in defending Serbian minority rights and historical monuments in15 Out of the democratic revolutions aimed at unseating illiberal regimes (Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia,
Slovakia, Kyrgyzstan) the US put the most ﬁnancial eﬀort to unseat Milosevic in Serbia. Thus, the Serbian
student group ‘‘Otpor’’ received larger amounts of funds than its Ukrainian counterpart ‘‘Pora.’’
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slightly more inﬂuential Albanian lobby, emphasizing aspects of criminality of
former Kosovo Liberation Army ﬁghters, and rejecting Kosovo’s favorable treat-
ment by the US (SUC, 2005:2). SUC members were invited to participate in
committees drafting the new Serbian constitution (SUC, 2003:3). Although expected
to be more democratic than the previous one, this constitution again declared
Kosovo an ‘‘integral part of Serbia’’ (CRS, 2006).
Both the Albanian and Armenian diasporas are linked to territorially based
entitiesdKosovo and Karabakhdwhich have aspired to statehood since 1991 and
have already built institutions that perform various governance functions since the
end of the secessionist warfare (for Kosovo after 1999, and for Karabakh after
1994). Yet, international legal sovereignty is missing in these cases. Contrary to
expectations of the literature on diasporas and homeland conﬂicts, considering
diasporic involvement with violence as the predominant means to achieve seces-
sionist goals, I argue that diasporas engage with procedural aspects of democracy
during non-violent periods. Such behavior constitutes a coping mechanism to ﬁlter
international pressures to democratize the proto-states. For example, the Albanian
diaspora resented but did not confront the United Nations Administration on
Kosovo’s policy of ‘‘standards before status.’’ The Armenian diaspora countered
criticism against semi-authoritarian practices in Armenia and Karabakh by
providing monitors to ensure free and fair elections. They engaged with procedural
aspects of democracy to demonstrate commitment to a democratic creed important
for the international community without abandoning more narrow nationalist goals.
Keeping their eyes on Kosovo’s future independence, the Albanian diaspora put
aside its internal divisions. It adopted a pragmatic attitude with the understanding
that if democracy is the ‘‘only game in town’’ conducive to achieving independence,
then the Albanian diaspora will play it. Diaspora organizations regularly provided
monitors for elections in Kosovo. The NAAC developed a special democratic
institutions project co-sponsoring Balkans-related conferences in Washington
(NAAC, 2004). Despite disagreements among their members, Albanian diaspora
institutions oﬃcially disapproved of the mob violence in 2004 when Kosovo Alba-
nians injured and killed a number of Serbs and destroyed Serbian cultural monu-
ments. Diaspora organizations did not actively stand in the way of the International
Tribunal indictment of former KLA commander and prime minister of post-war
Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj.16 Also, Albanian diasporic elites realized that they
could not avoid the minority rights discussion in Washington and be taken seriously
(Anon. 2, 2007). This has been especially true since 2004, when the ﬁnal status of
Kosovo returned to the US foreign policy agenda.
However, the diasporic unity did not involve liberal aspects for the democratization
of Kosovo. Similarly to the Serbian diaspora, the Albanian diaspora viewed devel-
opments in the homeland in zero-sum game terms (Anon. 3, 2007). Albanian diaspora
institutions had little concern for the mistreatment of the Serbian population after16 Haradinaj was acquitted in July 2008.
59M. Koinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42 (2009) 41e641999. Serbian minority interests were defended by the Serbian, not the Albanian
diaspora. Furthermore, althoughAlbanian diaspora organizations disapproved of the
violence in 2004, there was an implicit justiﬁcation in diaspora circles that such events
could be expected if negotiations were further delayed (Anon. 4, 2007).
Challenges to the international legal sovereignty of Karabakh have been decisive in
limiting Armenian diaspora involvement democratization. Unlike Kosovo, which
declared independence in February 2008, the conﬂict over Karabakh is considered
‘‘frozen’’ despite a 1994 cease-ﬁre. Thus, the Armenian diaspora has had no real
incentives for democratic behavior and has engaged with democratic procedures in the
most minimalist ways. It provided monitors for elections in recent years (Chouldjian,
2007). There is a disappointment with the international community’s lack of appre-
ciation of democratic eﬀorts. Chouldjian (2007) argues that ‘‘the fact that the people of
Karabakh have been performing better on elections than their neighbors in
Azerbaijan, has hardly been given a proper notice by the international community’’. In
addition, the ‘‘frozen’’ conﬂict triggers security dilemmas in the diaspora, exacerbating
old traumas. Most pronounced is a fear of Turkey, which refuses to recognize the
Armenian genocide in 1915, but is a major player in negotiations over the future of
Karabakh. Because of anti-Turkish sentiment, the Dashnaks became instrumental in
the 1998 ousting of Armenia’s President Ter Petrossian who aspired to a more
cooperative foreign policy towards Turkey (Libaridian, 1999).17
The Armenian diaspora utilizes traditional lobby and other methods to advance
statehood issues related to Karabakh. It lobbies to make sure that the US remains an
honest broker in the negotiations over its future despite its strategic interests in oil-rich
Azerbaijan (Chouldjian, 2007; Khazarian, 2007). TheArmenianAssembly of America
hosts on its premises inWashingtonD.C. a proto-embassy ofKarabakh. The diaspora
works to provide development aid by way of remittances and fund-raising for local
projects. The downfall of Armenia’s President Petrossian was also linked to a diaspora
judgement that he had mishandled the Karabakh issue. The diaspora stood ﬁrmly
behind a new government comprised of a number of veterans from the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh, including current Armenian president Robert Kocharian (Pan-
ossian, 1998; Libaridian, 1999; Shain, 2002). Thus, there is a consensus in diaspora
circles that achieving a ﬁnal solution for Karabakh could occur by peaceful means
other than a critical diaspora pressure on the current government (Khazarian, 2007).
Conclusions
This article explored the variation of diaspora involvement with democratization of
homelands in the post-communist world by discussing the Ukrainian, Serbian,17 Due to the trauma of the genocide, throughout the 20th century the Armenian diaspora has considered
Turkey a major security threat and Russia an ally. Thus, in the late 1980s the Dashnaks were reluctant to
support the 1991 independence of Armenia and Karabakh, fearing that this would alienate Russia, leave
Armenia unprotected, and possibly lead to a new genocide (Chorbajan, 2001, Papazian, 2001). Currently
the diaspora’s major goal is to link Turkey’s European integration with recognition of the genocide (ICG,
2007). So far it has succeeded in convincing France and the United States.
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tions of the literature on diasporas and homeland politics that diasporas would act in
exclusively nationalist ways, they were also involved with eﬀorts for democratization.
One diaspora (Ukrainian) linked to a state that enjoyed both international legal and
domestic sovereignty, demonstrated some involvement with liberal aspects of
democratization after 1989. Diasporas linked to homelands experiencing challenges
either to their international legal (Kosovo, Karabakh) or domestic sovereignty
(Serbia) involved with procedural aspects of democracy only. This variation can be
explained by the ways in which communities ﬁltered international pressures for
democratization. The Ukrainian diaspora realized that support for liberal aspects of
democracy could beneﬁt the state-building of a newly independent homeland and its
eﬀorts to escape Russian inﬂuence. The three remaining diasporas utilized procedural
aspects of democracy as coping mechanisms to advance unresolved nationalist goals
by means accepted by the international community. In the Serbian case, the diaspora
focused its support for Milosevic’s opposition not because of similar ideological
convictions with Western powers, but to unseat an opportunistic leader who betrayed
‘‘Greater Serbia’’ at Dayton. The Albanian and Armenian diasporas used procedural
aspects of democracy to advance the cause of self-determination of the proto-states to
which they were linked (Kosovo and Karabakh). In all three cases the diasporas did
not advance liberal aspects of democracy, but continued to see ethno-national issues in
the homeland in exclusively nationalist terms.
Apart from demonstrating that diasporas do engage with democratization
alongside nationalist practices, this article contributes to the scarce literature on
diasporas and democratization in three major ways. First, it adds nuance to schol-
arship on diaspora engagement with liberal vs. procedural aspects of democracy,
thus moving the discussion away from practices only. Second, it adds a comparative
dimension to a literature dominated by single case studies. Third, it theorizes about
diaspora activism during non-violent periods of the post-communist transitions of
1989e1991, which, in contrast to violent periods, have received little attention by
scholarship so far.
This paper speaks to the larger literature on international actors and democra-
tization. Although diasporas are clearly more focused on nationalist approaches,
they do not necessarily rule out democratic turnover and liberalism. Even the most
conservative among the four diasporas, the Armenian, sent monitors to ensure free
and fair elections in the homeland. Even leaders from a ‘‘conﬂict-generated’’ dias-
pora, the Albanian, usually dismissive about the rights of Serbs in Kosovo, have
realized that they cannot avoid a discussion about minority rights if they want to be
considered seriously in US foreign policy circles. Although established diasporic
institutions are not the major forces behind the electoral changes of Serbia and
Ukraine, recent political migrants, students, and individuals were nevertheless
involved in various ways. This demonstrates that although diasporas are not the
most likely agents of democratization in the post-communist world, they are not
inherently incapable of acting as such.
This work adds to a larger discussion about the link between democratization and
nationalism. Bunce (2003:176) argues that there is a positive linkage between
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communist world, particularly when republics of former ethno-federal statesdsuch
as Slovenia, the Baltic Republics, Macedonia and Ukrainedwere freed from
economic and political environments that would make their further democratization
unlikely. My analysis conﬁrms that a positive linkage between democratization and
nationalism exists, and relates to the relationship between diasporas and homelands.
Diasporas can maintain their nationalist interests but still respond to international
pressure for democratization, especially when viewing democratization as a means to
nationalist ends.
Two ﬁnal points could open a larger discussion about diasporas and democrati-
zation. If diasporas use procedural aspects of democracy to advance their nationalist
goals against the backdrop of international pressure for democratization, how much
does the concept of democracy become ‘‘stretched’’ in a world in which democra-
tization has become a global norm, but is de facto utilized for particularistic
purposes? In addition, if diasporas chose to utilize democratization for the
advancement of their nationalist goals, rather than to engage exclusively with
nationalism, will they be transformed by the process? Might they become more
moderate non-state actors in international politics? The answers to these questions
will constitute the topic of another research.
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